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First Steps
Intelligence Analysis in Canada during the 
Second World War 
A L A N  B A R N E S
Abstract : At the outset of the Second World War decision-makers in 
Ottawa were entirely dependent on the United Kingdom for finished 
intelligence on foreign military and political developments. During six 
years of war the intelligence work carried out in Canada expanded in 
several areas, and included a growing capacity to carry out intelligence 
analysis in several fields. An analytic group was established to exploit 
the mass of detailed information collected by the postal censorship 
programme. The Department of External Affairs created a small unit 
that drew on signals intercepts and other sources to assess political issues 
for senior officials. In the Department of National Defence, the newly-
created Joint Intelligence Committee took the first steps in producing 
strategic intelligence assessments from a Canadian perspective. These 
developments were all heavily influenced by Canada’s close intelligence 
relations with the UK and US. A major impediment to the development 
of an independent analytic capacity, however, was the lack of demand 
for Canadian-origin intelligence assessments from senior political and 
military leaders in Ottawa, who continued to look to allies for intelligence 
to inform national-level decisions.
Canada entered the second world war with little capacity to collect or analyse foreign intelligence, and little interest in doing 
so. Any intelligence Ottawa needed to make decisions regarding its 
foreign and defence policies was provided by the United Kingdom. But 
as the war progressed, Canada came to recognise the need to create 
its own intelligence capacity, particularly the ability to collect signals 
intelligence. This wartime effort laid the foundations for Canada’s 
involvement in the post-war “Five-Eyes” intelligence partnership that 
© Canadian Military History 2020
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2 First Steps
exists to the present day. The story of the birth of Canada’s signals 
intelligence organisation has sparked considerable scholarly interest.1
Another aspect of the wartime development of Canada’s foreign 
intelligence capabilities has received less attention: Ottawa’s initial 
efforts in producing independent intelligence analysis. The collection 
of secret information is an important part of the intelligence process, 
but it is seldom sufficient in itself. While in rare cases such secret 
reporting can feed directly into government decisions, more often 
individual covert intelligence reports only provide fragmentary and 
often conflicting snippets of information that need to be organised, 
compared with other sources and analysed in order to draw out 
their full significance. At a higher level of complexity, intelligence 
assessments which make forward-looking judgements about likely 
enemy actions can play a major role in national decision-making. The 
lack of such a capacity can have significant consequences. As just one 
example, when Canada received a request from the UK in 1941 to 
send troops to reinforce the garrison of Hong Kong, Ottawa had no 
independent ability to gauge the risks involved and in making this 
important decision relied on London’s assessment.2 
This article examines the various forms of intelligence analysis 
carried out in Canada during the Second World War in support 
of government decision-making or which contributed to the overall 
Allied intelligence effort. Canadians also carried out operational 
and tactical level intelligence analysis in the formations and units 
serving in active theatres overseas, but this activity took place 
within the framework of Allied intelligence structures and deserves 
its own study.3 In Canada, the war marked the beginning of efforts to 
1  See in particular John Bryden, Best Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in 
the Second World War (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1993); Kurt Jensen, Cautious 
Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence, 1939-51 (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2008); and Wesley Wark, “The Evolution of Military Intelligence in 
Canada,” Armed Forces and Society 16, 1 (Fall 1989): 77-98.
2  In the case of Hong Kong, it not clear that an independent Canadian assessment 
body would have come to a conclusion that differed from the flawed UK and US 
evaluation of the imminence of war with Japan, but the fact remains that Canada 
was entirely dependent on the judgement of others in making this decision.   
3  S.R. Elliot, Scarlet to Green: A History of Intelligence in the Canadian Army, 
1903-1963 (Toronto: Canadian Intelligence and Security Association, 1981) provides 
a comprehensive account of the intelligence work carried out overseas by the 
Canadian Army.  
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  3B A R N E S 
carry out national-level intelligence analysis and to produce strategic 
intelligence assessments.
exploiting canadian intelligence collection 
During the Second World War Canada developed a limited capacity 
to collect intelligence through the interrogation of prisoners of war 
and postal censorship. To produce useful intelligence, this required 
an analytical component to identify and synthesise the relevant 
information from the mass of detail obtained from these sources. 
In 1939 Canada had no experience in such work and early efforts 
were hampered by a lack of clear direction and poor organisational 
coordination. 
prisoner of war intelligence
Most German prisoners of war in Canada were transferred from 
Britain, and as the detaining power the UK retained responsibility 
for many aspects of their treatment, including intelligence matters. 
Canadian officials gradually became more involved as the war 
progressed, but largely in a supporting role. Most intelligence work 
involving prisoners of war related to monitoring security in the camps 
and obtaining material for use in UK and later US psychological 
warfare operations. For most of the war any analysis of intelligence 
gathered from German prisoners in Canada was carried out by Allied 
officers to meet Allied requirements. The Department of External 
Affairs (DEA) was keen that Canada should play a larger role, but 
this was not a priority for the military.4 It was not until May 1944 
that National Defence approved the establishment of a Prisoner of 
War Intelligence Section, subordinate to the Director of Military 
Intelligence. Some forty intelligence officers were assigned to camps 
in Canada to carry out interrogations largely focussed on obtaining 
order of battle and other military information to contribute to the 
4  Jean-Michel Turcotte, “‘An Important Contribution to the Allied War Effort’: 
Canadian and North Atlantic Intelligence on German POWs, 1940–1945,” Intelligence 
and National Security 34, 2 (2019): 289-306; and Don Page, “Tommy Stone and 
Psychological Warfare in World War Two: Transforming a POW Liability into an 
Asset,” Journal of Canadian Studies 16, 3 & 4 (Fall-Winter 1981): 110-120.
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overall Allied intelligence effort. Canadian naval intelligence also 
had a section dealing with naval prisoners of war.5 Little evidence 
remains of this work. The only report that appears to have survived 
in archival files is a staff list and description of the German naval 
training school at Flensburg-Mürwik.6 Whatever information of 
military value that German prisoners may have possessed was 
largely outdated by the time they arrived in Canada, and there was 
no effective analytical capacity to support the work of the officers 
carrying out interrogations. 
analysing censorship information
The collection of foreign intelligence via postal censorship eventually 
achieved greater success but at the beginning of the war it was 
hampered by a lack of direction and coordination. Departments were 
flooded with hundreds of unsorted reports derived from intercepted 
mail and telegrams from foreign countries. By December 1941 the 
file room in External Affairs had a backlog of thousands of unread 
postal intercepts. The department was not responsible for censorship 
but saw its potential value as a source of intelligence. By default, 
it took the lead in addressing the problem. George Glazebrook—an 
academic historian brought into the department for wartime duty 
who would go on to play a major role in the post-war Canadian 
intelligence community—put forward proposals for centralising and 
providing clearer direction to censorship operations.7 As a result, in 
May 1942 all aspects of the censorship function were brought under 
the authority of the Minister of National War Service. In addition to 
performing a security role by reviewing outgoing mail from Canada, 
5  John Roach, “History of Canadian Naval Intelligence, 1910-1968,” in Out of 
Darkness—Light: A History of Canadian Military Intelligence, Vol. 3, 1998-2005, 
Hal Skaarup (New York: iUniverse, 2005), 537.
6  Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 80-82.
7  Don Page, “Special DEA [Department of External Affairs] Wartime Assignments,” 
n.d. (c. March 1982), 5, 16, 43, RG25 BAN 2016-0036, Box 32, File 7-5-2 Part 1, 
Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Page was one of External Affairs’ official 
historians. Interestingly, most of the text of this manuscript later appeared in 
print as Peter St. John, “Canada’s Accession to the Allied Intelligence Community, 
1940-45,” Conflict Quarterly (Fall 1984): 5-21, perhaps as a way to circumvent 
departmental restrictions on publishing on this subject. See also John Hilliker, 
Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Vol. I – The Early Years, 1909-1946 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 268.
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the censorship organisation made a concerted effort to derive foreign 
military and economic intelligence from correspondence arriving in 
Canada from enemy-occupied areas, especially letters to German 
prisoners of war and civilian internees.8 The analysis of the mass of 
detail to derive broader conclusions was essential to extracting the 
full value of this information. 
By 1943 the postal censorship effort had expanded to 300 examiners 
reviewing tens of thousands of pieces of incoming correspondence 
each month.9 Through the adoption of a more systematic approach to 
managing the volume of mail and the hiring of university graduates 
to analyse the material, the postal censorship organisation was able 
to produce comprehensive reports on specific issues.10 A typical report 
from January 1943 drew on 500 letters over a two-month period 
to describe conditions in the Saar region of Germany, including 
information on air raids, food, heath and morale.11 Regular monthly 
reports were produced on conditions in Germany. For the March 1945 
issue 56,000 letters were reviewed. The report included a statistical 
analysis of German morale, tallying examples of “positive” morale 
(support for the leadership, faith in the prospect of victory, etc.) and 
“negative” morale (criticism of the authorities, war-weariness, etc.); 
a graph illustrated trends in morale over the previous six months. 
Postal censorship also prepared reports on other European countries, 
including France and Italy. One example was a report on France 
from June 1945 that described French attitudes towards the Allies, 
General de Gaulle and collaborators, among other subjects.12  
These assessed censorship reports went to a number of officials 
in Ottawa, but they were of limited use for Canadian purposes. The 
major recipients were the censorship organisations in London and 
Washington, where the reports contributed to the Allied psychological 
warfare campaign and the strategic intelligence analysis that was being 
8  Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 74-78.
9  Kurt Jensen, “Canadian Wartime Human Intelligence Collection: Intelligence 
Derived from Prisoners of War,” in Battleground Western Europe: Intelligence 
Operations in Germany and the Netherlands in the 20th Century, eds. Beatrice de 
Graaf, Ben de Jong and Weis Platje (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 2007), 85-86.
10  Page, “Special DEA Wartime Assignments,” 44.
11  Canadian Postal Censorship, “Report on Economic Conditions in the Saar Basin,” 
Regional Report No. 15, 9 January 1943, RG24, Vol. 11250, File 10-2-7, LAC. 
12  Canadian Postal Censorship, “Report on Conditions in Germany,” Periodical 
Diary No. 45, 12 March 1945; and “Conditions in France,” Report No. 1, 1 June 
1945, both in RG25, Vol. 2846, File 1520-C-40 Part 2, LAC.
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undertaken in those capitals. In 1943 some 800 Canadian intelligence 
reports a month—most of them derived from postal censorship—were 
being sent to Washington. The US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
valued the Canadian censorship reports as inputs to their own analysis 
of the situation in Germany. The Canadian postal censors worked 
closely with their US and UK counterparts; in August 1943 the heads 
of the three censorship programmes met in Miami to coordinate their 
activities.13 The Canadian postal censorship programme was very 
much a part of a larger Allied effort.
intelligence analysis in external affairs
The Second World War marked Canada’s entry into the world of 
signals intelligence, the systematic interception and decryption of 
foreign telegram and radio messages. A small organisation known 
as the Examination Unit was established in June 1941 under the 
administrative umbrella of the National Research Council to decrypt 
and distribute the intercepted messages. The raw traffic came from 
military intercept facilities and encrypted messages obtained by the 
censorship authorities. As the new organisation gradually found its 
feet, a stream of transcripts of individual intercepted messages—
mostly Vichy French and Japanese communications with their 
missions in the Americas—began to reach senior officials in External 
Affairs and elsewhere in government.14
creating the special intelligence section
External Affairs, however, was not entirely satisfied with this new 
material. As an unpublished internal history of DEA’s wartime 
intelligence activities notes: “The problem with raw intelligence 
coming from the Examination Unit was that it was never placed 
in a broad context where its significance could be appreciated for 
making decisions. External Affairs needed analysed rather than raw 
13  Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 83-84.
14  Gilbert de B. Robinson, ed., A History of the Examination Unit, 1941-1945, July 
1945, RG24, Vol. 29166, File WWII-31, LAC; and Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 
38-55.
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intelligence.”15 In September 1942, at Glazebrook’s urging, External 
Affairs formed a Special Intelligence Section to meet this requirement. 
The Section was headed by E. Herbert Norman, a former member of 
the embassy in Tokyo recently returned from Japanese internment. 
A Japanese-speaker, he had solid academic credentials as an expert 
on the politics and economics of Japan. The new Section was 
responsible for “the preparation of intelligence reports, in which will 
be brought together secret information which comes in from various 
sources concerning Japan and the Far East.”16 In his short history of 
15  Page, “Special DEA Wartime Assignments,” 17. The work of the Section is also 
briefly described in J.L. Granatstein and David Stafford, Spy Wars: Espionage and 
Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnost (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1990), 41-42.
16  Norman Robertson memo to DEA divisional heads, 25 September 1942, RG24, 
Vol. 29165, File WWII-15, Part 4, LAC.
E. Herbert Norman. [Canada. National Film Board/Library and Archives Canada/PA-134317]
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the Section written at the end of the war, Norman describes his job 
as “selecting, editing and otherwise interpreting the material which 
was produced by the Examination Unit.”17 
In order to be close to the source of its main raw material, the 
Special Intelligence Section was housed in the same building as the 
Examination Unit on Laurier Avenue in Ottawa, but organisationally 
it remained part of External Affairs. It was never larger than two 
officers, supported by three clerks and secretaries. In November 1942 
Norman was joined by Arthur Menzies to work on Vichy French 
traffic and, as Menzies commented in a later interview, to do anything 
that “Norman did not want to do.”18 Menzies was replaced by G.W. 
Hilborn in February 1944.19 Norman remained with the Section 
throughout its existence and was its driving force.
17  Herbert Norman, “Special Intelligence Section of the Department of External 
Affairs,” in A History of the Examination Unit, ed. Robinson, 1, RG24, Vol. 29166, 
File WWII-31, Part 1, LAC.  
18  Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 52.
19  Norman, “Special Intelligence Section,” 2. 
345 Laurier Ave. E. in Ottawa, the location of the Examination Unit and the DEA Special 
Intelligence Section. [Canada. Dept. of Interior / Library and Archives Canada / PA-034301]
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the special intelligence section’s assessment work
Initially, the reports produced by the Section primarily involved 
combining and summarising the intercepts received from the 
Examination Unit, often with added interpretive comments and 
cross-references to other reports.20 Such “single-source” reports 
(i.e. reports derived from a single type of information, in this case 
signals intercepts) continued to represent an important product of 
the Section, but Norman soon also began preparing assessments 
based on a wider range of sources and addressing broader topics. In 
addition to the intercepts from the Examination Unit, the Section 
had access to Canadian and Allied censorship reports, transcripts of 
radio broadcasts, newspaper reports and occasional debriefings from 
civilians repatriated from enemy territory, as well as the regular 
diplomatic reporting available to External Affairs. The earliest 
such “all-source” report is an October 1942 summary of Japanese 
attitudes towards the repatriation of civilians; it was based on signals 
intercepts, radio broadcasts and censorship reports.21
Over the next two years the Section produced a stream of analytic 
reports, with the main focus being Japan. Some, such as a detailed 
nineteen-page list of key Japanese officials derived from the monitoring 
of Japanese radio broadcasts, were probably intended primarily as 
reference documents to assist the work of the Examination Unit and 
postal censors.22 Other reports consolidated factual information from 
a variety of sources to provide a broader picture of a given issue. 
Examples include descriptions of changes in the Japanese cabinet, 
Japan’s diplomatic “listening posts” in South America and Ireland, 
and the background of the Japanese politician Satoshi Akao.23 In a 
covering note to a report on Tokyo’s reaction to the surrender of Italy, 
Norman remarked that he used diplomatic intercepts and broadcast 
monitoring reports and “tried to draw them all together to present 
20  Ibid., 3.
21  DEA Report, “Material Relating to the Repatriation of Americans, British and 
Canadians from the Far East,” 10 October 1942, RG25, BAN 2016-00628-5, Box 
6, File AD-2, LAC. Unless otherwise noted, all of the Special Intelligence Section 
reports cited are from this file. 
22  DEA Report, “List of Japanese Personalities of Current Interest,” 17 August 1943.
23  DEA Reports, “Recent Changes in the Japanese Cabinet and High Command,” 29 
February 1944; “Japanese Listening Posts,” 28 June 1943; and “Note on Bin Akao,” 
n.d. (c. January 1944). 
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what still remains a very incomplete and fragmentary picture.”24 
The true value of Norman’s expertise was reflected in a number of 
assessments that sought to go beyond the available facts to reach 
forward-looking conclusions. An early example is a January 1943 
assessment on the question of whether Japan was planning to attack 
the Soviet Union; based on his reading of all the available sources of 
information, Norman laid out the various factors likely influencing 
Tokyo’s decision, but ultimately he declined to make a judgement on 
this military question.25 More substantial conclusions were reached in 
Norman’s April 1943 paper on the likely impact on Japanese policy 
of the recent appointment of a new Japanese foreign minister, and a 
March 1943 overall assessment of “Japanese Prospects and Policy.”26 
A hand-written annotation on the latter paper indicates that Prime 
Minister Mackenzie King had passed it to British Foreign Minister 
Anthony Eden, an indication that Norman’s reports were read and 
valued at senior levels. 
Arthur Menzies was also involved in writing reports on Japanese 
subjects, even if his main focus was Vichy and Free French traffic. In 
November 1942, just after arriving in the Section, he prepared reports 
on Japan’s economic situation and on Tokyo’s propaganda efforts. 
The reports, based on a range of sources, were largely descriptive as 
Menzies did not have Norman’s expertise on Japan that would enable 
him to reach broader conclusions.27 The Section’s reporting on French 
activities included a description of Vichy negotiations with China 
over trade privileges, the visit of two Canadian journalists to Algiers 
at the invitation of the Free French authorities there, the Free French 
position concerning negotiations over a mutual aid agreement with 
Canada, and financial assistance from the Vichy regime to academic 
and religious institutions in Canada. The last three of these reports 
24  Norman to Hume Wrong, 21 September 1943, RG24, Vol. 29163, File WWII-5, 
Part 3, LAC; and DEA Report, “Japanese Reaction to the Surrender of Italy,” 21 
September 1943. 
25  DEA Report, “Is Japan Preparing to Attack the Soviet Union?” 22 January 1943. 
26  DEA Reports, “Recent Change of Japanese Foreign Minister and the Course of 
Japanese Policy,” 23 April 1943; and “Japanese Prospects and Policy,” 29 March 
1943. 
27  DEA Reports, “Japan’s Economic Position,” 1 November 1943; and “‘East Asia 
Charter’ and ‘Bougainville Victory’ Climax of Japan’s Propaganda Campaign,” 22 
November 1943. 
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were written by G.W. Hilborn who had replaced Menzies in the 
Section.28
In addition to reporting on Japanese and French matters, the 
Section produced analytical reports on a range of other subjects. In 
two detailed reports in March and April 1944, Hilborn provided a 
comprehensive assessment of Anglo-American diplomatic efforts to 
pressure Spain to abide by its neutral status. The factual aspects of the 
report likely drew on intercepts of Spanish diplomatic communications 
as well as press reports. In his analysis Hilborn examined not only 
Madrid’s actions but also the policy differences between Washington 
and London that complicated the discussions.29 
In October 1943 Norman wrote a long report on the morale of 
the German population and prospects for political (i.e. psychological) 
warfare, based on Canadian and US censorship reports and media 
articles rather than signals intercepts.30 Nevertheless, most reports 
by the Section were on subjects related to Asia, including papers 
on the implications for East Asia of the restoration of the Orthodox 
Patriarchate by Moscow, Chinese internal politics, the Indian 
nationalist leader Subhas Chandra Bose, the issue of Burmese 
independence and a list of Burmese personalities. These reports, 
based on press monitoring and historical information, were largely 
descriptive since the Section did not have deep expertise in these 
areas or access to relevant signals intercepts.31 
The reports produced by the Section were distributed to a small 
group of senior officials in External Affairs and to the three service 
intelligence directors. At least some reached the prime minister. 
Copies were also sent to British Security Co-ordination (BSC) in 
New York, a key link between the nascent Canadian intelligence 
28  DEA Reports, “Negotiations for Retrocession of French Privileges in China,” 14 
April 1943; “Visit to Algiers of Willson Woodside and Joseph Barnard,” 7 February 
1944; “Canadian-French Mutual Aid Agreement,” 11 March 1944; and “Financial 
Assistance Given by French to Institutions in Canada,” 6 October 1944. 
29  DEA Reports, “Recent Anglo-American Negotiations with Spain,” 23 March 
1944; and “Anglo-American Demands on Spain,” 5 April 1944. 
30  DEA Report, “Morale in Germany and Opportunities for Political Warfare,” 26 
October 1943. 
31  DEA Reports, “Far Eastern Repercussions of the Restoration of the Patriarchate 
in the Soviet Union,” 19 February 1944; “Chungking Policy Towards Chinese 
Puppets,” 21 February 1944; “Memorandum on Subhas Chandra Bose,” 6 July 
1943; “Burmese Independence,” 2 August 1943; and “List of Burman Personalities of 
Current Interest,” 3 September 1943. 
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community and its UK—and US—counterparts. The mechanism 
for the tasking of assessments is not clear; it is likely that many of 
the papers were written on the initiative of Norman, Menzies and 
Hilborn based on the available intelligence and their knowledge of 
departmental interests. Some requests for papers came direct from 
External Affairs, and BSC also had input into tasking.32 
Norman sought to establish relations with allied analytical 
groups. In visits to Washington he met with US Army analysts, and 
on other occasions he was able to discuss developments in the Far 
East with American and British officers passing through Ottawa.33 
The Section’s closest links appear to have been with the Research 
Branch of the US Office of Strategic Services. The OSS, a newcomer 
to the Washington bureaucracy, did not have access to US signals 
intercepts and was pleased to receive the Section’s summaries of 
Canadian intercepts (the verbatim texts were not shared).34 It is 
likely that the OSS received some of the Section’s analytical reports 
as well, since Norman had established direct working relations with 
OSS analysts and he received OSS reports on a variety of subjects.35 
His October 1943 paper “The Japanese in the Netherlands East 
Indies” was partially based on discussions with OSS analysts during 
a visit he made to Washington.36 The OSS’s outsider status in the 
US Intelligence community likely meant that the Section’s analysis 
received scant attention from the other agencies in Washington and 
thus had little impact on the assessments prepared by the US Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC). 
untimely demise of the special intelligence section
Paradoxically, these efforts to build links to the US entangled the 
Section in the rivalries among intelligence agencies in Washington 
and ultimately led to its abolition. In mid-1944 the US military raised 
objections to the sharing of the Section’s intercept summaries with 
the OSS and threatened to end cooperation with the Examination 
Unit if it continued. Lester Pearson, then at the Canadian embassy 
32  Page, “Special DEA Wartime Assignments,” 18.
33  Norman, “Special Intelligence Section,” 9. 
34  Bryden, Best Kept Secret, 197.
35  Ibid., 231.
36  DEA Report, “The Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies,” 16 October 1943, 
RG24, Vol. 29163, File WWII-5, Part 3, LAC.
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in Washington, was instructed to tell the OSS that it would cease 
receiving the summaries as they were no longer available. As historian 
John Bryden comments, “this excuse was given an aura of truth by 
closing Norman’s little office.”37
In January 1945 the Section was shut down and the staff 
returned to External Affairs’ offices in the East Block of the 
Parliament Buildings.38 Norman and a colleague continued to read 
and summarise Japanese and French intercepts for the department, 
but this seems to have occurred on a more intermittent basis. In his 
history of the Section, Norman mentions that occasional memoranda 
based on the Japanese traffic were also produced.39 Two examples 
of such reports exist in the available archival record, compilations 
of secret information received on Indochina and Thailand.40 The 
production of such reports is unlikely to have continued for long, 
however, since the end of the war would have rendered such work 
superfluous in the view of External Affairs, and in September 1945 
Norman was posted to serve as Canadian representative to the Allied 
occupation authority in Japan. 
The Special Intelligence Section was later described as “the 
flagship of Canada’s codebreaking efforts” during the Second World 
War.41 But its abolition marked the end of External Affairs’ brief 
experiment with a dedicated intelligence assessment capacity. 
Canadian diplomats would continue to produce political analysis as 
part of their regular duties, but the department no longer had a 
centre where analysts with deep expertise and immediate access to 
all sources of information were able to provide broader context to 
37  Bryden, Best Kept Secret, 251.
38  Norman Roberson letter to C.J. Mackenzie, 11 January 1945, RG24, Vol. 29167, 
File WWII-33, LAC. In January 1945, as the Section was being dismantled and in 
the midst of deliberations on the postwar future of Canadian signals intelligence, 
Norman proposed the creation of a “Canadian Signal Intelligence Centre” which 
would continue Canada’s wartime interception and cryptographic work and include 
a Special Intelligence Section to prepare assessments based on this and other 
information (Bryden, Best Kept Secret, 253). However, such an all-source analytical 
unit was not included in the Canadian signals intelligence organisation which 
emerged after the war.
39  Norman, “Special Intelligence Section,” 9-10.
40  DEA reports, “Secret Information Received by the Department […] Concerning 
Developments in Indochina,” 24 September 1945; and “Secret Information Regarding 
Recent Developments in Thailand,” 26 September 1945, both in RG24, Vol. 29167, 
File WWII-33, LAC.
41  Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, 41. 
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the raw intelligence and make informed judgements on questions of 
interest to the department and Canada. As the External Affairs 
official historian commented, the Section’s “usefulness depended on 
its ability to make sense out of the information derived from the 
[Examination] Unit’s decoded translations and to fit these into the 
broader context of the war.” He went on to add:
Precisely how important the Section’s work was for External Affairs is 
difficult to measure since like most intelligence information it became 
blurred with other factors in making decisions. It certainly gave officials 
a wider perspective on international happenings that [they] could not 
have otherwise acquired and advance insight on positions to be taken 
at important gatherings.42  
Because of its premature demise, the wartime experience of the 
Section had little impact on the development of Canada’s strategic 
assessment capacity in the years following the Second World War, a 
process that was largely driven by the military. It was to be another 
three decades before External Affairs would begin to develop a 
dedicated political intelligence analysis capability.43  
intelligence analysis in national defence
In the Department of National Defence, the three service intelligence 
directorates were responsible for providing intelligence to their 
respective Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC), 
but their capacity to do so was slow to develop and heavily dependent 
on allies. Canadian forces overseas received intelligence from the 
Allied formations under whose command they served, and National 
Defence Headquarters looked to the UK for strategic intelligence. 
Intelligence analysis was barely an after-thought for the military. Lloyd 
Kenyon, an Army officer deeply involved with post-war intelligence, 
later commented that during the war no intelligence analysis was 
done in Ottawa; there was nobody looking at the world situation 
42  Page, “Special DEA Wartime Assignments,” 18, 20.
43  See Alan Barnes, “A Confusion, not a System: The Organizational Evolution 
of Strategic Intelligence Assessment in Canada, 1943 to 2003,” Intelligence and 
National Security 34, 4 (2019): 464-479.
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and making judgements about enemy capabilities and intentions. 
Intelligence collected by Canada was sent to the Allies for analysis, 
and in turn Canada received intelligence summaries, situation 
reports and assessed intelligence from London and Washington. In 
Kenyon’s recollection, officials in Ottawa were quite content with 
this arrangement.44 His blunt remarks overstate the case, but not 
by much. During the later years of the war, the Canadian military 
did make some tentative steps into the field of strategic intelligence 
analysis, as will be explored below.
Even before the war the limitations of having separate service 
intelligence directorates was recognised by some, and a half-hearted 
attempt was made to coordinate and consolidate at least some of 
the intelligence work at headquarters. In April 1938, the Joint Staff 
44  Interview with Brigadier General Lloyd Kenyon, 21 September 1983, Reel 2, Side 
1 [segment 226-06], University of Victoria Canadian Military History Oral History 
Collections, accessed 15 January 2018, http://contentdm.library.uvic.ca/cdm/
compoundobject/collection/ collection13/id/ 1192/rec/1.
Department of National Defence Headquarters in 1947. [Canada. Department of National 
Defence / Library and Archives Canada MIKAN 4950811]
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Committee established a subcommittee to consider the feasibility of 
creating a “Joint Service Intelligence Section” that would combine some 
of the common functions of the service intelligence directorates. Mid-
level officers representing the intelligence staffs met to discuss various 
ideas for establishing closer working relations, share information and 
cooperate in matters common to all three services, such as by setting 
up a joint central registry where information from all sources would be 
collated. The army and air intelligence representatives shared varying 
degrees of support for these ideas. The naval representative, however, 
was strongly opposed, concerned that any change would interfere 
with the integral role of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in the 
British Admiralty’s worldwide intelligence network. Not surprisingly, 
after several inconclusive meetings, the idea was quietly shelved.45 
The service intelligence directorates went on to fight the war very 
much as independent fiefdoms.
military intelligence
The Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) was the largest of the 
three service intelligence staffs. At the outbreak of war the intelligence 
function was part of the Directorate of Military Operations and 
Intelligence, but in June 1942 DMI was established as a separate 
directorate under the command of Colonel W.W. (Jock) Murray, 
a First World War veteran brought back into the Army in 1939 
from his job as a Canadian Press parliamentary reporter to run 
the early telegram censorship programme.46 By the end of the war 
the organisation he controlled numbered just over 100 personnel, of 
whom forty-two were officers. The Foreign Intelligence Section, or 
MI-1, had nine officers and twenty-four support staff to cover foreign 
military forces and military operations worldwide. A larger number 
of DMI personnel dealt with security, and there were other groups 
responsible for overseeing the Army’s involvement in the signals 
intelligence effort, prisoner of war intelligence and administration. 
Much of the work of DMI was administrative in nature, including 
45  Documents on the proposed Joint Service Intelligence section can be found in 
RG24, Vol. 4052, File 1078-11-30, LAC, and RG24, Vol. 2696, File 5199-G, LAC.   
46  Elliot, Scarlet to Green, 425-7; and Bryden, Best Kept Secret, 10, 21. 
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the creation of the Canadian Intelligence Corps and overseeing the 
training of Army intelligence personnel.47 
MI-1 was responsible for keeping the Chiefs of Staff and senior 
civilian officials informed about the progress of the war. Initially, the 
section did little more than “cut up newspapers,” in the dismissive 
47  “Mobilization Establishment – DMI,” n.d. (c. 1953), RG24, Vol. 19211, File 
S-2140-75/73, Part 1, LAC; and Elliot, Scarlet to Green, 438. This document includes 
a description of the wartime DMI organisation.
Colonel W.W. “Jock” Murray, Director of Military Intelligence, July 1942 to February 1946. 
[Courtesy of the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence, Department of National Defence]
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view of one of their naval colleagues.48 After Canadian troops 
landed in Normandy, DMI provided the Prime Minister, Minister of 
Defence and the Chiefs of Staff with daily situation updates based 
on summaries provided by the UK and US. But rather than being 
intelligence reports, in the sense of dealing with enemy actions 
and intentions, these updates largely covered activities of Allied 
forces.49 MI-1 maintained an Information Room with maps of the 
battlefronts. Following a visit to the room, Minister of Defence 
Andrew McNaughton asked whether the information that Ottawa 
received was being properly interpreted, and stressed the need for 
officers capable of assimilating this information and using it to make 
forward-looking judgements. He received the faint assurance that the 
staff was doing the best possible job with the limited information 
48  Lieutenant Commander F.R.W.R. Gow memo to Chief of the Naval Staff, 23 July 
1938, RG24, Vol. 4052, File 1078-11-30, LAC.
49  Joint Intelligence Committee [JIC] Minutes, 15 June 1944, RG24, Vol. 2469, File 
715-10-16-1-3, Part 3, LAC.
Directorate of Military Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence Section (MI-1), 13 December 1944. 
[Courtesy of the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence, Department of National Defence]
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available and was warned of the dangers of making judgements 
without adequate information.50 
DMI published a range of regular products, almost entirely 
derived from material received from allies or press reporting. All 
of these reports were sent to recipients in Ottawa and military 
commands in Canada; DMI had no responsibility for providing 
operational intelligence to Canadian forces deployed overseas. DMI 
products included twice-daily news digests, battlefield situation maps 
and a Weekly War Review. The Weekly War Review provided a 
compendium of factual items on worldwide naval, ground and air 
operations based on situation reports received from Canada’s allies, 
with no analysis of enemy intentions or judgements concerning 
possible future developments.51 DMI reproduced and disseminated 
UK and US reports on enemy organisation, equipment and tactics 
to headquarters and training establishments in Canada. It also 
produced occasional reports on specific subjects, such as economic 
intelligence reports on crop conditions in Europe and the economic 
significance of Sardinia, as well as descriptive papers on the history, 
geography and military forces of Siam and Persia.52 These descriptive 
reports recycled information received from allies rather than being 
original analysis. It is not clear who received these reports or what 
they did with them, as they hardly seem relevant to any decisions 
that Canadian officials faced. 
naval intelligence
Naval intelligence in Canada was heavily influenced by the RCN’s 
strong historical, operational and personal connections with 
the Royal Navy. Since 1921 Canada had served as the “North 
American Station” in the British Admiralty’s worldwide intelligence 
50  Elliot, Scarlet to Green, 453.
51  Colonel W.W. Murray memo to Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Foreign Intelligence 
in Peacetime, Annex E Background of NDHQ Intelligence, 1939-1945,” 26 September 
1945, RG24, Vol. 6178, File 22-1-43, Part. 1, LAC. Weekly War Review reports can 
be found in RG24, Vols. 31018, and 31019, LAC.
52  DMI Reports, “Economic Intelligence Report--Crop Conditions in Europe,” 18 
August 1943; “Economic Intelligence Report--Economic Significance of Sardinia,” 
19 August 1943; “Economic Intelligence Report--Economic Implications of the 
Occupation of the Italian Mainland,” 20 August 1943; “Notes on Siam,” 2 December 




Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier,
20 First Steps
organisation.53 It was “responsible, through the [Canadian] Chief of 
Naval Staff, to Admiralty for the collection of intelligence in the 
North American Area.” In return, the RCN received “intelligence for 
naval purposes on all parts of the world” from the UK.54 The other 
intelligence staffs in Ottawa regarded naval intelligence as “working 
for the Admiralty and not Canada.”55
When war broke out, Commander E.S. (Eric) Brand, a Royal Navy 
officer seconded to Canada, was the Director of Naval Intelligence 
and Plans. After several organisational changes, in June 1942 
naval intelligence became a separate directorate under Lieutenant 
Commander C.H. (Herbert) Little, the first Canadian to become 
Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI).56 By then it had grown from 
very small beginnings to an organisation of seven sections, dealing 
with security, censorship, naval prisoners of war and a photographic 
library. There were also three production sections, which prepared 
daily ship location reports, periodic summary reports—including 
the North American Station Intelligence Report (NASIR) for the 
Admiralty—and political intelligence reports.57 DNI’s analytical 
capacity was limited. The intelligence summaries it produced were 
largely compilations of information gleaned from press reports and its 
other limited sources of intelligence. For example, NASIR No. 8 from 
August 1941 included items on German and Japanese merchant ship 
movements in South America and on the US west coast and a large 
section on US defence policy and economic developments, all derived 
from press reports.58 By the end of the war DNI was producing 
occasional reports on specific subjects, such as key air targets in 
Japan, a description of the Yunnan administration in China and a 
paper on the likelihood of a Japanese peace offer.59 These reports 
53  Roach, “History of Canadian Naval Intelligence, 1910-1968,” 510-519.
54  Gow, draft memo, n.d. (c. July 1938), RG24, Vol. 4052, File 1078-11-30, LAC.
55  Gow memo to Chief of the Naval Staff, 23 July 1938, RG24, Vol. 4052, File 1078-
11-30, LAC.
56  C.H. Little, “Now it Can All be Told,” in Salty Dips Vol. 3 (Ottawa: Naval Officers 
Association of Canada, 1988), 218; Roach, “History of Canadian Naval Intelligence,” 
519-38; and Bryden, Best Kept Secret, 10-13.
57  Roach, “History of Canadian Naval Intelligence,” 536-37; and “Naval Intelligence 
in Canada,” Canadian Forces School of Intelligence and Security, CFSIS Précis 
8-603, n.d.
58  North America Station Intelligence Report, NASIR No. 8, 1 August 1941, RG24, 
Vol. 31019, File Intelligence Reports, Nov 1940-Sep 1941, LAC.
59  “Naval Intelligence in Canada.”
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appear to be aimed largely at meeting Allied requirements and it is 
unlikely that they were shared widely in Ottawa.
Unlike the other intelligence directorates in Ottawa, the RCN 
played a major role in providing operational intelligence to Canadian 
and Allied naval forces. After 1942, however, this activity took 
place outside of DNI. Commander J. de Marbois was the driving 
force in building the RCN’s capacity to locate enemy submarines 
through radio direction finding and traffic analysis. In 1942 he was 
instrumental in the establishment of an Operational Intelligence 
Centre (OIC) in Ottawa. This body, made up of staff transferred 
from DNI, was placed under the command of the Naval Signals 
Division, which was responsible for the radio intercept stations that 
gathered the raw intelligence.60 In April 1943, the RCN was given 
command of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic theatre of operations, 
the only independent theatre of war commanded by a Canadian.61 
The existence of an effective OIC was a key requirement for the UK 
and the US to entrust Canada with this responsibility, which for the 
first time gave the RCN direct access to the ULTRA intercepts of 
German naval communications.62 
air intelligence
In the lean years of the 1930s, when the Royal Canadian Air 
Force (RCAF) had dwindled to almost nothing, the Directorate of 
Intelligence–Air (DIA) had for practical purposes been absorbed into 
DMI. With the outbreak of war, it regained its independent existence, 
but throughout hostilities it only numbered three intelligence officers 
plus various technical advisors and a small staff to look after maps, 
classified documents and other administrative matters. The leadership 
of DIA passed through several hands before Group Captain H.R. 
(Ronnie) Stewart was appointed to the position in June 1941. DIA 
was largely concerned with order of battle information and technical 
intelligence on enemy aircraft capabilities. As with the other service 
60  Roach, “History of Canadian Naval Intelligence,” 538; and Bryden, Best Kept 
Secret, 141-142.
61  Marc Milner, Canada’s Navy: The First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1999), 123.
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intelligence staffs, it relied on intelligence it received from allies to 
support RCAF planning and training activities in Canada.63 
Near the end of the war DIA became the home of a new 
collaborative experiment, the Inter-Service Topographical Section. 
This group was authorised by the Chiefs of Staff in November 1944 
with the stipulation that this be done within existing resources. It 
was housed in DIA because that directorate had available office 
space. The section, with a planned strength of three officers and 
seven supporting staff, was responsible for collecting photographs, 
topographical studies and related maps to support all three service 
intelligence directorates. It inherited the photographic library 
previously maintained by DNI. Its civilian head, Dr. Diamond Jenness, 
a noted anthropologist with extensive knowledge of the Canadian 
arctic, made considerable efforts to tap into the equivalent UK and 
US topographical intelligence organisations for relevant reports to 
build up a topographical library.64 The Section was only gradually 
getting established when the war in Europe ended in May 1945, but 
it was to become deeply entangled in the debate over the postwar 
structure of the Canadian intelligence community.  
the canadian joint intelligence committee
In the early years of the war there was no formal mechanism to 
coordinate the work of the three service intelligence directorates, 
although they were all involved in the bodies overseeing various 
aspects of the government’s intelligence work, such as censorship and 
signals intelligence. On 5 June 1941 Norman Robertson, the Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs (deputy foreign minister), 
hosted an informal meeting of officials involved in intelligence for the 
63  Flying Officer W.A. Field memo, “Notes on a Conference on Co-ordination of 
Intelligence Services in Canada,” 16 June 1941, RG24, Vol. 5230, File 19-15-16, Part 
1, LAC; Wing Commander F.F. Lambert memo to Secretary JIC, “Reorganization 
and Review of Existing Directorates of Intelligence in the Three Services,” 10 July 
1946, RG24, Vol. 8164, File 1700-51, LAC; and James Cox, “Canadian Defence 
Intelligence 1939-1946” (unpublished paper, Royal Military College of Canada, 9 
December 2004), 13-14. Between 1939 and 1941 Wing Commander R.L. Logan and 
Group Captain C.C. Walker (and possibly others) held the position of DIA.  
64  JIC Minutes, 16 November and 1 December 1944, and 27 February 1945, RG24, 
Vol. 33541, File 1274-10, LAC; and Glazebrook memo to Robertson, 4 April 1945, 
RG24, Vol. 29164, File WWII-8, LAC.
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purpose of sharing “information as to intelligence activities and to 
discuss means of improving co-operation and avoiding overlapping.” 
At the meeting were the heads of the service intelligence directorates, 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) intelligence and Tommy 
Stone, the senior official in External Affairs responsible for 
intelligence matters. The discussion appears to have largely focussed 
on avoiding duplication of effort with the RCMP on security matters, 
but broader issues were also considered, particularly the question 
of the proper organisation of intelligence in Canada. A report on 
this meeting prepared by the DIA representative includes a proposal 
for a “Central Intelligence Committee” reporting to the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee and composed of the service intelligence directors, 
RCMP intelligence, External Affairs and the censorship organisation. 
It would provide overall coordination for all of the bodies in Canada 
involved in intelligence work, including security intelligence. It is 
not clear whether this proposal was discussed at the June meeting 
or formulated by DIA afterwards.65 In any case, no further action 
was taken at this time to formalise the coordination of Canadian 
intelligence.
formation of the jic
The entry of the United States into the war in December 1941 had 
a huge impact on Canada, the military and the service intelligence 
staffs. Until that time, they had looked to London for intelligence 
reports, summaries and assessments, which were mostly provided 
on a direct service-to-service basis. The intelligence staffs were now 
desperate to increase the amount of information they obtained from 
Washington, particularly on the situation in the Pacific. During 
1942 service-to-service channels with the US Army and Navy were 
established or strengthened, but this was not fully adequate. The 
US had recently established a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) 
based on the model of the British JIC. Made up of the heads of 
Military and Naval Intelligence, and representatives of the OSS 
and the State Department, it had a mandate to prepare strategic 
intelligence assessments and daily intelligence summaries. Unlike the 
65  Flying Officer W.A. Field memo, “Notes on a Conference on Co-ordination of 
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British JIC, it had no responsibility for coordinating other aspects of 
the US intelligence effort.66 The problem for Canada was that there 
was no equivalent body in Ottawa to serve as a point of contact 
and receive US JIC reports. Initially, US JIC assessments were sent 
directly to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, but this route 
was not satisfactory for either side.67 Something had to be done. 
Action was spurred by the planned visit to Ottawa in November 
1942 of a senior delegation of US intelligence officers representing 
the US JIC.68 The service intelligence directors realised that there 
was a need to establish a reciprocal structure in Ottawa to manage 
Canadian relations with the US JIC. On 3 November Colonel Murray 
put forward a proposal for such a body to the CSC on behalf of 
the three service intelligence directors. His memorandum began 
by declaring that “the operations of the present Directorates is 
characterised by a collaboration which is so close and so mutually 
co-operative that it is difficult to see how it can be bettered,” but 
went on to concede that “nevertheless it would be advantageous to 
give this close liaison official sanction in the form of a CANADIAN 
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE.” He proposed that the 
terms of reference of the US JIC, with slight modification, be adopted 
for its Canadian counterpart.69 The CSC formally authorised the 
new committee on 10 November. The JIC was established as a 
sub-committee of the CSC, to consist of the three heads of service 
intelligence with the senior member serving as chair. Its mandate 
was “to conduct intelligence studies and to prepare such special 
information as may be required by higher authority, or as may be 
indicated by the situation.” The committee was authorised to create a 
sub-committee to assist in its work and to exchange intelligence with 
66  Canadian Joint Staff (Washington) memo, “Joint Intelligence Committee,” 23 
May 1942, sent under cover of Canadian Legation Washington letter to Lester 
Pearson, 29 May 1942, RG25, Vol. 3031, File 4043-40C, LAC. 
67  DIA memo to DMI and DNI, 19 November 1942, RG24, Vol. 33541, File 1274-10, 
Part 1, LAC.
68  Canadian Joint Staff (Washington) telegram to NDHQ, 9 October 1942; Stewart 
memo to Little, “US Intelligence Officers 16-18 November 1942,” 14 November 1942; 
and other documents on the visit of the US delegation, all in RG24, Vol. 33541, File 
1274-10, Part 1, LAC.
69  Murray memo to Secretary CSC, “Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee,” 3 
November 1942, RG24, Vol. 5183, File 15-19-30, LAC.
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the US JIC and the UK JIC (Washington).70 The JIC at its creation 
was very much a military entity: it reported through the military 
chain of command and was made up entirely of military officers. Its 
structure and purpose paralleled that of a number of other “joint” 
(i.e. tri-service) military committees that coordinated a range of 
activities at National Defence Headquarters. Unlike both its UK and 
US counterparts, during the war years it had no representative of the 
Department of External Affairs.71 
The JIC first met as a formal body on 24 November 1942 with 
Group Captain Stewart in the chair. Its initial act was to appoint 
a Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, whose duties were defined as 
“maintenance of inter-service liaison and collaboration in matters 
relating to operational intelligence generally, and to undertake such 
special assignments as may be referred to them.” The Committee 
also discussed the recent visit of the US JIC delegation which had 
prompted the creation of its Canadian counterpart.72 The second 
meeting dealt with procedures for exchanging information with the 
US JIC.73 The Intelligence Sub-Committee began its work on 30 
November.74 
work of the jic
The weekly meetings of the JIC soon established a regular routine. 
Much of the Committee’s attention was taken up with consideration of 
security issues, such as censorship, protection of information, security 
70  CSC Minutes, 10 November 1942. Wartime minutes of the CSC can be found 
in RG24, Vols. 8081, 8082 File 1272-2, LAC; RG24 Vol. 21813, LAC, contains an 
additional set. The UK JIC (Washington) was part of the UK military liaison staff 
in the US. 
71  Throughout its history the official name of this body was the Joint Intelligence 
Committee, abbreviated JIC. Occasionally the informal abbreviation C[anadian]
JIC was used but this never had official sanction. If it was necessary in official 
correspondence to distinguish the Canadian JIC from its allied counterparts the form 
JIC (Ottawa) or JIC(O) was sometimes used. 
72  JIC Minutes, 24 November 1942. Wartime JIC minutes held by LAC can be found 
in several files including: RG24, Vols. 2468-2469, File 715-10-16-1-3 (DMI copy) and 
RG24, Vols. 33541-33542, File 1274-10 (DNI copy), LAC.
73  JIC Minutes, 1 December 1942.
74  Lieutenant W.P. Wallace memo to DNI, “First Meeting of the Sub-Committee of 
the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee,” 30 November 1942, RG24, Vol. 8088, 
File 1274-10-2, LAC. Most minutes of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee can be 
found in this file.
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of maps and charts, restrictions on photography and the updating 
of security regulations. Reflecting the burden of this security-related 
work, in April 1943 the CSC authorised a second JIC sub-committee to 
deal with security issues.75 In March 1944, Little, now a Commander, 
assumed the chair when members proposed that the position should be 
rotated annually.76 The Intelligence Sub-Committee met once or twice 
a week to exchange information among the three service intelligence 
staffs. It also took responsibility for establishing an Inter-Service 
Contact Register of persons in Canada who had knowledge of the Far 
East.77 It became the practice for the Secretary of the JIC—generally 
an officer appointed by the JIC chair from his directorate—to serve as 
the chair of the Intelligence Sub-Committee.
In May 1943 the JIC was alarmed by reports of German activity 
in Greenland, fearing that the enemy could make similar inroads 
into remote parts of Canada. A key problem was obtaining accurate 
information from US forces in Greenland. It directed the Intelligence 
Sub-Committee to address the situation and considered its report 
on 24 June. The “Greenland Report,” the first substantive paper 
prepared by the Sub-Committee, was a policy document rather than 
an intelligence assessment. No copy of this report has survived, but 
it appears to have largely comprised recommendations for obtaining 
information from the US. The problem was not a US unwillingness 
to share information, but rather a lack of an effective mechanism 
to do so. The Sub-Committee recommended the establishment of a 
“Northern Information Centre,” but this idea found little favour with 
the Chiefs of Staff.78 The JIC remained sporadically engaged with the 
Greenland situation during the fall of 1943. DMI was unsuccessful 
in obtaining more information via its channels with the US Army. It 
was not until February 1944 that the US JIC provided Canada with 
detailed reports on the interrogation of a German officer captured in 
75  CSC Minutes, 6 and 27 April 1943. 
76  CSC Minutes, 3 March 1944; and JIC Minutes, 7 March 1944. 
77  Air Vice Marshal W.A. Curtis memo, “Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee,” 
19 May 1944, RG24, Vol. 5190, File 15-9-73, LAC.
78  CSC Minutes, 29 June 1943. 
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Greenland over six months earlier. By this point Greenland was no 
longer a priority for Canada and took up no more of the JIC’s time.79 
Despite this considerable activity, in its early existence the 
JIC did not address its primary mandate: to “conduct intelligence 
studies”—that is, to prepare strategic intelligence assessments—for 
“higher authority.” The Canadian JIC was ostensibly modeled on the 
US JIC, which had as its clear purpose the preparation of strategic 
assessments for the US Joint Chiefs. To accomplish this, the members 
of the US JIC sub-committee were employed full-time in preparing 
intelligence assessments. In Canada, the work of the Intelligence Sub-
Committee was very much a secondary responsibility for its members 
and consisted primarily of the exchange of information among the 
service intelligence staffs, not the preparation of assessments. 
It is not surprising that this was the case. Senior levels of 
government and the military made no demands for Canadian-origin 
assessments and there was no expectation that strategic analysis 
would be carried out in Ottawa. The Chiefs of Staff continued to rely 
on Allied assessments for decisions regarding plans for the defence 
of Canada. It was the Joint Planning Committee (JPC, responsible 
to the CSC for preparing military plans) that was tasked with 
determining the likely “Forms and Scales of Attack” that Canada 
faced, not the JIC. In its consideration of the threat, the JPC looked 
to allies for guidance. In early 1943 it was the UK assessment—with 
modifications suggested by Washington—that formed the basis for 
recommendations to the Cabinet War Committee concerning revisions 
to Canada’s defence plans. Later in the war the CSC looked primarily 
to the UK-US Combined Intelligence Committee in Washington for 
its assessment of the threat.80 The Chiefs of Staff appear to have 
been content to leave the intelligence directors to get on with their 
secretive work with minimal interference and few demands. 
79  JIC Minutes, 31 May, 9 and 24 June, 5 July, 7 September 1944, 19 and 24 
January, 12 February 1945; and US Army interrogation reports, “Information from 
documents and statements of a German officer captured in Greenland 23 July 1943,” 
2 September, 2 October, and 16 November 1943, RG24, Vol. 33541, File 1274-10, 
Parts 1 and 2, LAC.
80  See RG24, Vol. 6168, File 15-24-10, LAC and RG24, Reel C-11673, File 9042-1-3, 
Part 1, LAC [both files are entitled “Forms and Scale of Attacks”].
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jic intelligence assessments 
The available records are silent on what prompted the JIC in mid-
1943 to take its initial steps towards fulfilling its mandate of producing 
strategic assessments. At its meeting on 12 August 1943, the Committee 
for the first time discussed the production of “joint appreciation[s].” 
It directed the Intelligence Sub-Committee to “conduct a study and 
prepare a survey on enemy capabilities, potentialities and intentions” 
in the Pacific Theatre and as they affected the east coast of Canada, 
Newfoundland and Labrador; these assessments would come to be 
known as the Pacific and Atlantic Reports.81
This action appears to have been taken by the JIC on its own 
initiative: there is no indication that it was responding to direction 
from the CSC or individual Chiefs. But it is interesting to note 
that the decision took place at the same time that Defence Minister 
J.L. Ralston had asked for an updated assessment of the enemy 
threat to the east and west coasts. In responding to this request 
the JPC had turned to the Combined Intelligence Committee in 
Washington for the intelligence assessment that formed the basis for 
its recommendations to the Cabinet War Committee.82 The Canadian 
JIC played no role. Faced with this situation, the JIC members may 
have felt the need to begin taking the Committee’s mandate seriously 
and develop Canada’s own capacity to produce strategic intelligence 
assessments or else remain forever in the shadow of the Allies.
Faced with its new and unfamiliar assignment, the Intelligence 
Sub-Committee approached DMI for advice on how to proceed. At his 
recommendation, it struck an ad hoc committee made up of members 
of the three service intelligence directorates to prepare draft reports 
for the consideration of the Sub-Committee.83 In practice, over the 
following months the line between the Intelligence Sub-Committee 
and its drafting group was frequently blurred, since neither of these 
roles was full-time and both drew on the same small pool of officers 
in the intelligence staffs.
81  JIC Minutes, 12 August 1943.
82  Ralston memo to Chief of the General Staff, “Scales of Attack,” 20 July 1943; UK-
US Combined Intelligence Committee assessment, “Scale of Attack on the East and 
West Coasts of North America,” 13 August 1943; and Chiefs of Staff memo [prepared 
by JPC] to Cabinet War Committee, “Forms and Scale of Attack,” 19 August 1943, 
all in RG24, Vol. 6168, File 15-24-10, LAC.
83  Intelligence Sub-Committee Minutes, 13 and 16 August 1943.
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atlantic report
The Intelligence Sub-Committee first turned to the matter of 
assessing enemy capabilities and intentions as they affected the East 
Coast of Canada, since this task was more limited in scope than 
examining the situation in the Pacific. A draft of the Atlantic Report 
was tabled at a meeting of the Intelligence Sub-Committee on 20 
August and discussed by the JIC three days later. A revised draft 
was prepared in mid-September. After spending its full meeting 
on 20 September discussing the paper, the JIC approved the final 
version on the 24th.84
“Enemy Capabilities in the North Atlantic Area” thus became the 
first strategic intelligence assessment produced by the Canadian JIC. 
The report totalled twelve pages, beginning with a page-and-a-half 
summary of its key findings. The Committee judged that Germany 
was capable of launching a raid by a limited number of surface 
vessels or submarines, or a raid by long distance aircraft carrying 
bombs or paratroopers. In its preliminary draft, the Intelligence 
Sub-Committee judged that “the chances of any of the participating 
craft returning are so small that the possibility of [such raids] being 
undertaken may be disregarded.” In the final version, however, the JIC 
left the door slightly ajar by concluding: “It is doubtful that Germany 
would be able to carry out [such raids] except on an extremely small 
scale.” It went on to speculate that the Germans might consider the 
airfield at Goose Bay, Labrador or the aluminium smelter at Arvida, 
Quebec to be of sufficient strategic importance to warrant an attack. 
In addressing the question of likely German intentions—as opposed 
to theoretical capabilities—the report concluded that these “would 
appear to be limited to” the use of submarines to attack shipping in 
Canadian waters or landing agents or saboteurs in Canada.85 
The body of the report was divided into sections prepared separately 
by each of the intelligence directorates. The longest section, dealing 
with the naval threat, described the current state of the German fleet 
and concluded that it was “very improbable” Germany would send 
84  Intelligence Sub-Committee Minutes, 20 and 24 August, and 14 September 1943; 
and JIC Minutes, 23 August, and 20 and 24 September 1943.  
85  Draft, “Atlantic Theatre,” 21 August 1943; and JIC Assessment, “Enemy 
Capabilities in the North Atlantic Area,” 24 September 1943, RG24, Vol. 33541, File 
1274-10, Part 2, LAC.
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a surface naval force to attack Canada, although submarines would 
probably continue their attacks in Canadian waters and could land 
agents and saboteurs. Under “Military Considerations” the Army had 
little to add other than to reiterate the possibility of submarine-
landed saboteurs. The air section provided information on the status 
of the German air force, and considered the possibility of using 
refuelling points in Greenland as well as potential targets in Canada. 
It concluded that “a German air attack on Canada […] is technically 
possible” and might occur if the Germans determined that an attack 
on a target in Canada was more “strategically or psychologically” 
significant than on a closer target. The appendices provided detailed 
tables on the deployment and status of the German fleet, as well as 
performance characteristics of German ships and aircraft. A map 
of the northern Atlantic and north-eastern Canada indicated areas 
within range of German long-range aircraft.86 
The report was important in that it marked the beginning of 
Canadian efforts to produce strategic intelligence assessments, but 
it nevertheless fell short in many areas. The paper focussed mostly 
on theoretical German capabilities. Lacking any secret reporting on 
Berlin’s intentions, its findings were largely based on the assumption 
that its future actions would look much like its past actions—a sound 
but unsurprising conclusion. The naval, military and air aspects were 
dealt with separately, in order of service seniority rather than their 
relevance to the assessment. This separate treatment of the problem 
led to some duplication and minor inconsistencies among these 
sections and the paper’s conclusions. The paper demonstrated that 
even after the creation of the JIC, the service intelligence directorates 
were still working as a loose confederation of independent agencies 
rather than a coordinated whole. 
The JIC submitted the report to the CSC for its consideration. 
The Chiefs noted the report at their meeting of 22 October and 
directed that any future JIC assessments should first be submitted 
to the Joint Planning Committee, which would then forward it to 
the Chiefs with their comments. The CSC stressed that the Joint 
Intelligence and the Joint Planning Committees should work closely 
together rather than operate as separate entities.87 It is not clear what 
86  JIC Assessment, “Enemy Capabilities in the North Atlantic Area,” 24 September 
1943.
87  CSC Minutes, 22 October 1943. 
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further distribution the report received, but it likely remained limited 
to members of the CSC, JPC and JIC; there is no indication that the 
report was shared with other government departments in Canada or 
with London or Washington. 
Almost a year later, the JIC considered and approved a revised 
version of the Atlantic Report at an ad hoc meeting on 14 July 
1944. This was a slightly shorter assessment—numbering four pages 
plus appendices—but covered much the same ground, often using 
the same wording. In the “Conclusions” the JIC “considered [it] 
improbable that Germany will make any attack on the east coast of 
North America.” However, it then seemed to make a fine distinction 
between an “attack” and a “raid,” saying that Germany was still 
capable of carrying out maritime raids by a small number of surface 
vessels or submarines, or air raids by a limited number of long-range 
aircraft. But, as with the first report, it went on to say that such raids 
were “doubtful […] except on an extremely small scale.” Its judgement 
about likely German intentions—that they were limited to the use of 
submarines to attack shipping in Canadian waters or landing agents—
was unchanged from the earlier report. The naval section in the body 
of the report stated that it was “very improbable” that Germany 
would risk “almost certain” destruction of major vessels in a raid on 
Canada; the naval threat therefore remained confined to submarines 
shelling Canadian targets, attacking shipping in Canadian waters or 
landing a small number of agents or saboteurs. The military section 
declared that “German military operations [against Canada] can 
be ruled out” and, as in the first report, reiterated the possibility 
of saboteurs landed from submarines. This report included a new 
section on “Psychological Considerations” which assessed that “[i]n 
her desire to pave the way for more favourable peace terms, Germany 
may attempt to influence public opinion in Canada by subversive 
propaganda methods. To this end a limited number of Nazi agents or 
contact men could be landed by U-boat or long-range aircraft.” The 
air section was shorter than the earlier report but it repeated the 
same wording in its bottom-line judgement on the threat of air attack. 
The report was distributed to members of the CSC, JPC and JIC.88
This version of the Atlantic Report—along with the Pacific 
Report—was also sent to the UK JIC, the first time Canadian 
88  JIC Minutes, 21 July 1944; and JIC Assessment, “Enemy Capabilities in the 
North Atlantic Area,” 14 July 1944, RG24, Vol. 33541, File 1274-10, Part 3, LAC.  
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strategic assessments had been shared with allies. It was reviewed 
by members of the UK Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, the full-
time body that drafted papers for the UK JIC. In their comments 
on the report, the British analysts downplayed the German threat 
to Canada. They felt that an attack by naval surface vessels was 
“extremely unlikely,” and that while a raid by long-range aircraft was 
“technically possible, it is very unlikely.”89 
Two further revisions of the Atlantic Report were produced, on 
22 November 1944 and 11 January 1945. These were much shorter 
assessments: two pages with no appendices. Both concluded that “the 
danger that Germany will make an attack against the east coast of 
North America is negligible.” The reports nevertheless assessed that 
Germany continued to be “theoretically” able to launch naval and air 
raids against Canada. In the JIC view, German intentions continued 
to be focused on submarine attacks in Canadian waters and the 
landing of agents and saboteurs. The January 1945 assessment added 
the judgement that the Germans also aimed to “keep our present 
convoy and air search organisations functioning, thus denying large 
forces to European operations.”90 Both reports were sent to members 
of the CSC, JPC, JIC and UK JIC.91 No copies were sent to other 
Canadian departments or to the US JIC.92
pacific report
The tasking that the Intelligence Sub-Committee received in August 
1943 to prepare a report on the enemy’s capabilities and intentions 
in the Pacific Theatre involved a much more extensive effort than 
the Atlantic Report. Rather than assessing the threat to Canada, 
the Pacific Report entailed an evaluation of all aspects of Japan’s 
89  Secretary [UK] Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee memo to Secretary JIC, 3 
August 1944, RG24, Reel C-11673, File 9042-1-3, Part 1, LAC; and JIC Minutes, 17 
August 1944. 
90  JIC Assessments, “Enemy Capabilities in the North Atlantic Area,” 22 November 
1944, RG24, Vol. 5190, File 15-9-73, LAC; and “Enemy Capabilities in the North 
Atlantic Area,” 11 January 1945, RG24, Vol. 2469, File 715-10-16-1-3, Part 4, LAC.
91  The planning staffs compared the JIC assessments with the “Forms and Scales 
of Attack” used for defence planning and recommended that no changes be made 
to Canada’s defence posture. (Director of Military Operations and Plans memo to 
Chief of the General Staff, 6 December 1944, RG24, Reel C-11673, File 9042-1-3, 
Part 1, LAC).  
92  JIC Minutes, 22 November 1944, 11 January 1945.
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strategic capabilities and intentions. The Sub-Committee received 
little guidance from the JIC on how it should approach this task, 
and in its internal discussions grumbled about the “great difficulties 
involved in compiling so general a report.” The drafters also suffered 
from a lack of information on the strengths and locations of Allied 
forces in the Pacific, which would clearly be a key factor in assessing 
Japan’s likely actions.93 Unfortunately, no copies of the various 
versions of the report exist in the archival files currently open to 
researchers.94 Nevertheless, the available records that refer to this 
report allow for at least a limited discussion of its contents. 
Three versions of the Pacific Report were produced. The first, 
“Japanese Capabilities, Potentialities and Intentions,” was dated 10 
November 1943. It was subsequently revised as “Estimate of Japan’s 
Present Position and Its Potentialities” on 3 April 1944, and “Estimate 
of Japan’s Present Position and Intentions” on 8 September 1944.95 
These were very substantial reports, comprising a “Conclusions” 
section which provided an overview of Japan’s military capacity and 
its strategic intentions, eight text sections and up to ten appendices. 
Subjects addressed in the text included the “Political and Economic 
Situation in Japan” (including issues such as oil, food and armaments 
production), “Relations between Japan and Russia,” “Japanese Policy 
in China,” “Japanese Intentions in South-east Asia,” the “Situation 
in the Netherlands Indies,” and the “Strategic Importance of the 
Kuriles.” The appendices included detailed information on Japanese 
raw materials, the strength and deployment of Japanese military, 
naval and air forces, and topographical and logistic information on 
Formosa and the Kurile and Nansei Islands.96 Lacking a complete 
copy of the report, its overall conclusions on Japanese intentions are 
not known. But it is likely that the paper was largely descriptive, 
with only limited and cautious judgements on Tokyo’s future actions. 
It is not clear who was the intended readership. The report may have 
93  Intelligence Sub-Committee Minutes, August 1943. 
94  LAC does not hold a copy of the report. The Privy Council Office continues to 
hold wartime JIC documents; it has so far refused to release the copy of the Pacific 
Report in its possession. 
95  JIC Minutes, 2 November 1943, 6 April, 15 June, 8 September, and 22 November 
1944; and summary list of JIC files, n.d. (c. 1944), all in RG24, Vol. 2469, File 715-
10-16-1-3, Part 3, LAC. 
96  Intelligence Sub-Committee Minutes, 19 June 1944; and Secretary [UK] JIC letter 
to Secretary JIC, 1 August 1944, RG24, Vol. 33541, File 1274-10, Part 3, LAC.
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been of some use to military planning staffs by bringing together a 
wide range of information on Japan’s capabilities, but this level of 
detail was probably less relevant for senior officials. 
The preparation of the initial report and its two revisions placed 
heavy demands on the Intelligence Sub-Committee and its ad hoc 
drafting group over a period of more than a year. The sections of the 
report were assigned to individual drafters and the completed sections 
discussed as a group. Herbert Norman of External Affairs’ Special 
Intelligence Section—probably Canada’s foremost expert on Japan 
at that time—and Dr. Jenness of the Inter-Service Topographical 
Section provided input into this work, but neither appears to have 
been directly involved in the discussion of the drafts. Because much 
of the report comprised detailed factual information and the drafting 
and revision process was spread over several months, the drafters 
had to continually update the paper as new information was received. 
Although the work of the Intelligence Sub-Committee was ostensibly 
a part-time responsibility, in practice the chair (who also served as 
Secretary of the JIC) was required to spend all of his time working 
on the paper in the weeks before it went to the JIC for discussion. His 
challenge was to reconcile conflicting information and judgements in 
the text sections and appendices with each other and with the overall 
conclusions of the report.97 
The first version of the Pacific Report was not sent to Canada’s 
allies, but when the JIC decided in December 1943 to produce a revised 
report its main reason for doing so was to have a version that could 
be shared with the British JIC.98 When reviewing the revised paper 
on 28 April 1944, the CSC rejected the JIC’s recommendation that 
copies be sent to the UK and US JICs, saying that “nothing was to 
be gained by such action, as the information in the report was readily 
available to these organisations.”99 In their subsequent discussion of 
the matter, the members of the JIC concluded “that it was important 
to maintain the channel which had been opened with the British 
J.I.C., and […] that there should be some return to the U.S. J.I.C. 
for the papers which they make available to the Canadian services.” 
The Committee decided to individually lobby their respective Chiefs 
97  Intelligence Sub-Committee Minutes, 27 March, 3 April and 12 June 1944; and 
JIC Minutes, 2 November 1943.
98  JIC Minutes, 29 December 1943. 
99  CSC Minutes, 28 April 1944.  
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to reverse their decision. In this they succeeded, and copies of the 
revised report were sent to London and Washington in May.100 The 
British JIC responded with six pages of detailed comments which 
the Intelligence Sub-Committee considered during the drafting of the 
next version of the report.101 In Washington, however, the Canadian 
Joint Staff—the tri-service group responsible for liaison with the US 
military—raised concerns about Canada producing its own strategic 
intelligence assessments:
What we wish to avoid, of course, is anything that may give the U.S. 
J.I.C. the impression that we are trying to compete with them in the 
preparation of high-level intelligence studies. We feel it would be more 
to our advantage to encourage their view that we look to them for all 
possible information on the Pacific area. In this way we may obtain 
from them more intelligence than they would be disposed to release, if 
they assumed that we are in a position and prepared to duplicate the 
work they are doing. […] In these circumstances we think it is the part 
of wisdom for us to remain, so to speak, in the wings. The Americans 
hold the Pacific stage and we incline to the view that it is wise to refrain 
from encroaching on it.102
The JIC minutes do not record the response of members to this 
proposed abandonment of a vital national intelligence function, nor 
is there any record of Washington’s reaction to the Pacific Report.
No further efforts were made to update the Pacific Report after 
the third version was produced in September 1944. By this time, 
Canada was receiving assessments from the UK/US Combined 
Intelligence Committee on Japan’s capabilities and likely future 
actions, as well as papers on a range of other subjects.103 The JIC 
may have felt that continuing to produce a Canadian version of this 
assessment no longer served a useful purpose, especially given the 
100  JIC Minutes, 1, 10 and 23 May 1944; and CSC Minutes, 14 May 1944. 
101  Secretary [UK] JIC letter to Secretary JIC, 1 August 1944, RG24, Vol. 33541, 
File 1274-10, Part 3, LAC.
102  CJS(W) letter to Secretary JIC, 10 June 1944, reproduced in JIC Minutes, 15 
June 1944. 
103  UK/US Combined Intelligence Committee Reports, “Estimate of the Enemy 
Situation, Pacific-Far East,” 11 September 1944, RG24, Vol. 31018, File Europe 
1944-1948, LAC; and “Estimate of the Enemy Situation, Pacific-Far East,” 23 
January 1945, RG24, Vol. 8142, File 1480-6, Part 1, LAC.
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heavy demands it placed on the Intelligence Sub-Committee and the 
difficulty in keeping up-to-date on the rapidly changing situation.
other jic assessment work
In addition to these broader strategic analyses, the JIC also produced 
at least one narrowly-focussed intelligence assessment during the 
war. In December 1944 External Affairs contacted the Chiefs of Staff 
over concerns about Japanese moves toward Chungking, the location 
of the Canadian embassy in China. The request was passed to the 
JIC, which assembled a group headed by Dr. Jenness to draft an 
immediate assessment to assist in making a decision on whether to 
evacuate the embassy. In creating this ad hoc group, it is clear that, 
unlike in the UK and US, the JIC did not consider its Intelligence 
Sub-Committee to be a standing body for the preparation of 
assessments. The drafting group, meeting over two days, prepared a 
two-page assessment that concluded: “It is not considered that the 
Japanese are intending to attack Chungking in the near future.” The 
JIC, in their meeting on 17 December, produced a condensed one-
page version of this report as their reply to External Affairs.104 
This paper demonstrates that the JIC could produce intelligence 
assessments in response to specific requests at relatively short notice, 
although it appears it was rarely called upon to do so. On another 
occasion, when the Director of Civil Defence in Newfoundland asked 
for an assessment of the potential threat of rocket or “V-bomb” 
attacks against Newfoundland, it was the Director of Military 
Operations and Plans who responded; he concluded that such an 
attack was “possible but not probable.”105 The JIC had clearly not 
yet established its position in the minds of the Chiefs of Staff as the 
obvious place to turn for such an assessment.
104  JIC Minutes, 15 and 17 December 1944; and “Report of Ad Hoc Committee” 
[assessment of Japan’s military intentions in China], 16 December 1944, RG24, Vol. 
2469, File 715-10-16-1-3, Part 4, LAC.
105  CSC Minutes, 19 January 1945. 
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canada’s wartime experience of intelligence analysis
Canada began the war with no ability to analyse intelligence on 
foreign issues. By the end of the war the censorship programme had 
developed a considerable analytical capacity and in External Affairs, 
Herbert Norman’s small team had gained experience in producing 
all-source analysis of political issues. Much of this reporting—
especially by the censorship programme—was aimed at supporting 
the overall Allied intelligence effort rather than meeting specifically 
Canadian requirements. In National Defence, the newly-formed 
Joint Intelligence Committee commissioned the first Canadian 
strategic intelligence assessments. In all of these organisations, 
analysts were learning on the job with few precedents and little 
organisational guidance. Measured against the tradecraft standards 
of later years, their work could be criticised in a number of areas. 
Their judgements were often cautious and vague. The JIC reports 
were frequently burdened with excessive detail which obscured their 
analytical conclusions. Lacking information on enemy intentions, the 
reports fell back on assessments of enemy capabilities—sometimes in 
theoretical terms—rather than attempting to make judgements on 
likely enemy actions. Many of these same comments could be made 
of the UK and US wartime assessments; all Allied analytic groups 
were dealing with the same learning curve.  
With time and experience such methodological shortcomings could 
be addressed; more difficult to fix were fundamental challenges that 
affected Canadian strategic analysis throughout the war. Foremost 
among these was the lack of demand for strategic assessments from 
senior Canadian political and military leaders. As C.C. Crean—an 
External Affairs officer and key figure in the postwar Canadian 
intelligence community—later commented on the wartime work of 
the JIC: “no demands were made on the Joint Intelligence Committee 
[…] for appreciations, upon which war plans were based, and as a 
consequence the intelligence organisation in Canada remained 
relatively unimportant and in large measure neglected.”106 Ottawa had 
decided largely to avoid making decisions on issues where intelligence 
assessments might have made a useful contribution. Canada, through 
choice and circumstance, was not involved in the formulation of Allied 
106  G.G. Crean presentation to National Defence College, “Canada’s Intelligence 
Organization,” 31 May 1951, RG24, BAN 1997-98/281, Box 1, File 4883, LAC.
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war strategy. The decisions taken by Prime Minister Mackenzie 
King’s government dealt primarily with issues around the provision 
of military forces and material resources to the Allied coalition rather 
than on how those resources should be employed in winning the 
war.107 With no call for strategic intelligence assessments from senior 
officials, the JIC was left to decide on its own what it might do in 
this area. The few assessments it did produce do not appear to have 
been received by the Chiefs of Staff with particular enthusiasm. It is 
hardly surprising then that the JIC was not more active in producing 
such assessments.
Another factor affecting the development of a capacity to carry 
out independent intelligence analysis was the role that the UK and 
US played in assisting, guiding and shaping Canada’s intelligence 
effort. Canada benefited enormously from its intelligence links with 
its two closest allies, but these relationships had negative as well as 
positive effects on Canada’s efforts to develop its own intelligence 
capacity. A key element was the assumption in Ottawa, particularly 
among senior military officers, that all necessary intelligence would 
come from the Allies. Therefore, anything that might affect this 
vital flow of intelligence had to be avoided. The concern expressed 
by the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington—that Canada should 
not be seen to be trying to compete with its allies in producing 
strategic intelligence assessments—was probably shared widely in 
Ottawa. Canadian interests could also be affected by the vagaries 
of its intelligence relationships and internal rivalries among allied 
agencies. The decision to close Norman’s Special Intelligence Section 
showed that maintaining good relations with allies and safeguarding 
the continued receipt of signals intercepts trumped the production of 
Canadian political intelligence assessments. 
Some key figures in the wartime intelligence community sought 
to make a distinctive Canadian contribution to the Allied intelligence 
effort. In particular, officials in External Affairs took pains to see 
that Canada’s role in prisoner of war intelligence, censorship and 
107  For an overview of King’s determination to avoid any role in strategic decision-
making, see Tim Cook, Warlords: Borden, Mackenzie King, and Canada’s World 
Wars (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2012), 220-221, 299-300, 303-304, 315-316, 325. For a 
broader discussion of Canada and the Allied direction of the war, see C.P. Stacey, 
Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: 
Information Canada, 1970), 137-202.
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psychological warfare was recognised.108 Individual military officers 
also viewed the relationship with allies as being between partners 
and sought to maintain an independent Canadian posture. On a 
visit to London, Commander Little was invited to attend a meeting 
of the British JIC, where he was dazzled by the “brass around 
the table” but “spoke as the head of the Canadian organisation, 
willing to co-operate but proud of our own identity and with our 
own responsibilities.”109 Nevertheless, most senior military officers in 
Ottawa appeared quite willing to subordinate the Canadian role in 
intelligence to the wider good of alliance interests. There was little 
understanding or appreciation of the value of independent Canadian 
intelligence assessments. For these officers, the most important 
contribution that Canada could make was aiding in the collection 
of intelligence to meet Allied requirements as a quid pro quo for 
the continued receipt of Allied secret reporting and assessments. In 
this view of Canada’s role, the production of strategic intelligence 
assessments in Ottawa contributed little to the Allied effort and in 
some circumstances might even undermine other more important 
elements of the intelligence relationship. 
The creation of the Joint Intelligence Committee, a key step 
in the development of the Canadian intelligence community during 
the war, was itself primarily driven by the need to safeguard 
relations and information flows with allies. As we have seen, its 
mandate—which assigned it responsibility for producing strategic 
assessments—was modeled on that of the US JIC. However, despite 
this surface resemblance, the wartime Canadian JIC was a rather 
different creature than its US and UK namesakes. Unlike both the 
UK and US JICs, the Canadian JIC played only a very limited 
role in producing strategic assessments during the war. Unlike the 
corresponding sub-committees in the US and UK, the Canadian JIC’s 
Intelligence Sub-Committee was not principally a drafting group for 
strategic assessments. Unlike the UK JIC, the Canadian JIC had no 
responsibility for coordinating the broader intelligence community in 
Ottawa. Even within the Department of National Defence, it played 
only a limited role in coordinating intelligence matters; it was careful 
not to encroach on the mandates of the service intelligence directorates 
and consequently only dealt with issues that all three agreed should 
108  Don Page, “Tommy Stone and Psychological Warfare in World War Two,” 110-120.
109  Little, “Now it Can All be Told,” 222.
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be handled jointly. For the most part, this meant that during the war 
the Canadian JIC dealt primarily with security and administrative 
issues, and its Intelligence Sub-Committee was largely occupied 
with the exchange of intelligence among the service intelligence 
directorates. Nevertheless, the Canadian JIC did accomplish its 
true—albeit unstated—purpose: to provide an effective conduit for 
the receipt of strategic intelligence from the US and UK JICs. The 
overwhelming requirement for Canada was to facilitate the vital flow 
of intelligence from allies. In this the Committee succeeded.
In the waning months of the war there were some signs that the 
JIC recognised a need to broaden its role by bringing non-military 
organisations into its ambit. On 25 June 1945 the Chiefs of Staff 
approved a recommendation from the JIC that representatives of the 
Department of External Affairs and the RCMP be invited to join the 
Committee as associate members.110 This provided a broader view 
of Canadian intelligence requirements and a more comprehensive 
structure to address them. It also brought the organisation of the 
Canadian JIC closer into line with that of the UK and US JICs, 
which included representatives from the Foreign Office and State 
Department. The JIC now looked very much like the “Central 
Intelligence Committee” that had been mooted four years earlier. 
Time would tell whether this expanded body would grow into the 
wider role it had implicitly created for itself.
By mid-1945 discussions were taking place concerning the postwar 
shape of the Canadian intelligence community. Much of this focussed 
on the organisation and management of signals intelligence.111 But 
some members of the intelligence community were also thinking in 
broader terms about the need for a capacity to carry out intelligence 
analysis and to produce independent strategic assessments to inform 
Canadian policy. This argument was put forward in a September 1945 
memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff written by Colonel Murray on 
behalf of the JIC on the subject of “Foreign Intelligence in Peacetime.” 
Murray flagged Canada’s almost complete dependence on intelligence 
from the UK and US, warning that it “virtually compels us to accept 
the assessment of others” on key issues of importance to Canada. 
His memo proposed the creation of a “Joint Coordinating Bureau of 
Intelligence” which would be the “nerve centre for the collection and 
110  CSC Minutes, 25 June 1945; and JIC Minutes, 6 July 1945.
111  Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 117-136. 
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digestion of Foreign Intelligence.” He went on to say: “There can be 
no useful or intelligent digestion of information unless it goes through 
a stage where it is analysed and examined alongside other relevant 
information of a like nature, that is available from other sources.”112 
However, this view from within the intelligence community was not 
backed by any call from policy-makers for such a Canadian analytical 
capacity or for Canadian-origin strategic assessments. The question 
of the level of demand in Ottawa for strategic analysis would be an 
important issue affecting the development of a Canadian intelligence 
assessment capacity in the years following the Second World War.113 
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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